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Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order:  
A Tragedy, The First Part
Bart J. Wilson*
This article is a short, scientific story of the labyrinthian  
human career, of humankind’s place in the natural order of 
the world, and of the evolution of moral rules and rule fol-
lowing that make the extended order of civilization possible. 
Drawing upon work in anthropology, biology, and linguistics,  
I weave a science-based narrative of how Homo sapiens 
came to be the only primate to convert enemy aliens into 
trading friends. It is a Goethean story of the human condi-
tion that postulates the common origins of and modern 
tension between Pleistocene and Anthropocene morality. It is 
also a Hayekian story of human universals and the unique-
ness of our species that explicates some necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for our prosperity.
Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast, 
The one wants to separate from the other.
Faust, J.W. von Goethe1
* Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, contact information: bartwilson 
@gmail.com. This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions from partici­
pants at a conference “The Ends of Capitalism,” sponsored by the Classical Liberal 
Institute at the New York University School of Law, on February 26–27, 2015. 
For valuable comments on earlier drafts, I sincerely thank Gus Gradinger, Taylor 
Jaworski, Erik Kimbrough, Jimmy Langner, Jan Osborn, Matt Ridley, Sarah Skwire, 
Vernon Smith, Anna Wierzbicka, Brianna Asmus, Sarah Brosnan, Zach Dutra, and 
Ryan Johnson.
1 J.W. von Goethe, Faust (Author’s literal translation).
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36 Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order
No longer the end pursued but the rules observed make the action 
good or bad.
The Fatal Conceit, F.A. Hayek2
I .  P R E L U D E  O N  O U R  S P E C I E S
Homo sapiens is the only species in the history of the planet to turn 
its principal “hostile force of nature,” itself, into a friend. Homo sa-
piens is the only species in the history of the planet to deliberately 
extend its own average life expectancy and intentionally decrease 
its own rate of infant mortality. Homo sapiens is the only species in 
the history of the planet to actualize healthier and more comfortable 
lives for itself. Homo sapiens is a marvel. We . . . are a marvel.
If these facts are not sufficiently marvelous to shock the reader, 
then let’s ponder why the facts aren’t marvelous. Everyone lives in 
this dynamic teeming world, but to many these facts are not known. 
The 22 percent who live in extreme poverty do not know them 
because they do not live them.3 The day has yet to arrive when we 
can say that no one lives in poverty. But even of those who do live 
long lives peaceably and comfortably, not many know these facts 
well, or have known them for long. It was just in 1990 when 47 per­
cent of the world lived in extreme poverty.4 In absolute terms and 
as a percentage of the world’s population, more and more people are 
living longer, better lives.
Yet there is an uneasiness. However it may be that more and 
more people are escaping poverty, not everyone is escaping its grav­
ity at the same speed. Those who left earlier are accelerating in their 
standard of living. Despite seeing nothing but exponential growth 
behind us in world GDP per capita, we doubt the entire species is 
being lifted out of poverty. We see nothing but decay in the relative 
altitudes achieved, and we see others as weighted down or worse, 
left behind. In the back of our minds there is fear, not wonder, about 
this liftoff from poverty. What if our species has cheated biology 
with stolen fuel? What if instead of being a marvel our species has 
created a monster, something more than human and something we 
cannot control.
Whether we are exceptional or have created a monstrous Adam 
of our labors, consider the place our species occupies in nature. Like 
2 F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 88 (Routledge 1998) (W.W. Bartley III, ed).
3 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013 (June 2013), 
online at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/mdg­report 
­2013­english.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2015).
4 Id.
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all forms of life (animal, plant, fungus, protistan, and moneran) 
our genes monitor our physical growth, metabolism, and behavior.5 
Genes provide continuity, and genes provide for change. Homo sapi-
ens is no exception. Like most or all animals, we learn how to act in 
and react to our environment. Monarch butterflies east of the Rock­
ies migrate north and south, except for the year­round residents of 
Florida who stay put for the good weather. By a process of trial and 
error, success reinforces and failure weakens patterns of action. Our 
movements may be probabilistic and individually unpredictable, but 
they are not completely random. If there is no moist matter to mud­
puddle at a particular spot, a butterfly flutters away to find another, 
contingent, of course, upon the prevailing wind and whether an ori­
ole is diving. Patterns of action that are loose and indeterminate 
make survival more likely. Predictably precise patterns make for 
easy targets and are maladaptive to incremental changes in the envi­
ronment.
Like some birds, many mammals, and most primates, we hand 
down patterns of actions. Some of these actions include instilling 
in infants patterns that are not acquired by the genes of a parent. 
When conditioned patterns of actions are the results of training 
from teachers who were likewise habituated to this pattern by their 
earlier teachers, the individual has acquired a practice. While biolo­
gists use the term tradition to describe this additional mechanism 
for continuity and change, tradition, and to a lesser extent custom, 
connotes a concomitance of belief with a habitual way of acting that 
I wish to avoid at this point. Practices may reach their apogee in 
Homo sapiens when these practices bond with thinking and know­
ing to produce traditions, but we are not that different from brown­
headed cowbirds, bottlenose dolphins, and white­faced capuchin 
monkeys in that we all learn practices from our mentors.6
Like all mammals, our sociality starts with the nursing tie between 
mother and young, which is consequently the source of mammalian 
clustering.7 All members of a mammalian cluster categorize each 
other. In the closest category no two individuals are treated exactly 
the same. These intimates deal with each other as individuals. You 
5 Except where noted, see Charles F. Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (McGraw­
Hill 1973), and references therein for details on the likenesses of Homo sapiens to 
other species.
6 Dorothy M. Fragaszy and Susan Perry, eds, The Biology of Traditions: Models 
and Evidence (Cambridge 2003).
7 Only 10–20 percent of all mammals cluster beyond mere mating and the mother­
offspring nutritional link. See Peter J. Jarman and Hans Kruuk, eds, Phylogeny and 
Social Organization in Mammals, in David B. Croft and Udo Ganslober, eds, 
Comparison of Marsupial and Placental Behavior 80–101 (Finlander Verlag 1996).
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38 Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order
might say they deal “personally” with each other, though conspecifi­
cally would be nonanthropomorphically more accurate. The mother 
may be the only member of a young mammal’s inner circle, and 
this may change with age. In time litter mates may also be treated 
as individuals, but one need not be closely related to know an indi­
vidual as an individual. Whether a large or small set, the defining 
characteristic of the closest members in a cluster is that they are 
known to each other as individuals.
Beyond this inner circle, however, individuals are indistinct; they 
are categorized into various groups and treated as all members of 
the group are treated—the same. Category membership need not be 
symmetrical. For example, on the pain of punishment all subordi­
nates know the dominant adult male as an individual, but the domi­
nant adult male may treat all subordinate males as merely members 
of the group of subordinates. In mammalian sociality then, there are 
the conspecifically known, whom we treat as individuals, and the 
conspecifically unknown, with whom our relations are stereotyped, 
that is, our patterns of actions and reactions are uniformly applied. 
The conspecifically unknown may be allies, part of the fit and proper 
background of the cluster, or they may be aliens, hostile and feared. 
Like all mammals, we play. We play to learn, to prepare for eat­
ing, sleeping, and fighting as adults. We also play to have fun. One 
important difference between primates and other mammals is that 
primates have extended lifespans and consequently an extended child­
hood and adolescence. This means that primates play longer when 
young. Primates also continue to play as adults. When we are young 
at heart, as one says, we continue to learn and hence innovate in our 
actions. Play makes our inherently conservative patterns of actions 
more flexible while on the thin margin for survival. 
Another defining characteristic of our order is that, as C.F. Hock­
ett emphasizes, “[ p]rimates enjoy physical proximity and bodily 
contact.”8 We primates take pleasure in regularly being in each oth­
er’s company. It feels good to be in the proximity of those we know, 
and when not in the presence of those we know, we desire to be. But 
more than that, primates have a good time together. Our pleasure is 
mutual, and our fun is mutual. The result of these differences with 
other mammals is that, as an order, “primates who know each other 
simply do more different things together.”9 
Alien primates, on other hand, are an instant physical threat. One 
either fights an alien when equally fit for combat or withdraws when 
outnumbered or physically outmatched. Not surprisingly, primate 
clusters do not intermingle (though bonobos and some species of 
8 Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature at 68 (cited in note 5).
9 Id at 72.
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baboons are an occasional exception). Out of necessity small vulner­
able groups may merge and large clusters may subdivide, but almost 
never does an individual alien join a different cluster as a new full­
fledged member. Membership of a primate cluster is largely for life. 
Primate sociality is the most complex of the class. It balances our 
inner circle treatment of individuals as individuals with the mutual 
aid of the broader cluster against environmental threats. We are not 
individually large and formidable enough to withstand predators on 
our own and we don’t play the numbers game of producing oodles 
of young so that just a few might survive. Primate sociality falls in 
between stoic individuality and mass anonymity. By interconnect­
ing the individually known to the individually unknown, primate 
sociality is the foundation of community and has evolved for the 
perpetuance of the community. An individual qua an individual mat­
ters to those to whom we are known; that is the primate way. The 
community also matters, but not the community qua the commu­
nity. The community of mutual aid is simply the complement of 
the set of aggressive aliens, a social formation that makes survival 
possible. Primate sociality is the source of our connatural, that is, 
unlearnt, feelings toward each other and hence, a big hence, the 
source of our moral sentiments.
We have enough comparative biology. The history of our sociality 
is deeper and more shared with the rest of the animal kingdom than 
we might pridefully think. In it also we see our fear of the fearless 
and therefore powerful alien. Combine this common history with 
symbolic thought and civilization and we will have the makings of 
restless, dissatisfied human beings. But I anticipate. The value of 
placing humankind in evolutionary context is not to pigeonhole our 
actions and to treat the patterns as constraints so given. Nor espe­
cially is it to be a moral guide. Rather, it is to situate humankind’s 
lot, to move with thoughtful haste through time, from the Miocene 
through the Pleistocene to the Holocene now. 
I I .  P R O L O G U E  O N  T H E  P L E I S T O C E N E  P L A I N
As humble and humbling as our genealogical relations may be, we 
are the small god of the world. We stand alone with a spark of heav­
en’s light: symbolic thought.10 All chordate communication systems, 
except ours, are bound to the here and now.11 Only the human com­
munication system can refer to a threat not physically present or a 
10 See Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language 
and the Brain (Norton 1998).
11 See Derek Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue: How Humans Made Language, How Lan-
guage Made Humans (Hill & Wang 2009).
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food source beyond the hill. And only the human communication 
system exhibits symbolic relations among the signs. 
Most primate calls can vary in frequency and loudness.12 The 
more frequent or louder is the danger call the more intense the state 
that elicited the sign. Hearers interpret this similarity between the 
sign and the intensity of the caller’s state and respond accordingly. 
This “iconic” reference between the sign and what it refers to is old 
hat for primates. Other primate calls are “indexical,” that is, they 
point in space and time to distinct threats right here, right now. A 
vervet monkey has a different call to alert the rest of the troop to the 
presence of either a leopard, an eagle, or a snake, each eliciting a dif­
ferent response: run up for a leopard, run down for an eagle, and look 
around for a snake.13 To be a primate as any primate is to interpret 
iconic and indexical signs.
The spark that defeats all other animals is symbolic thought. What 
was the selection pressure that ignited symbolic thinking in the genus 
Homo? Every species must adapt to the facts of its environment to 
survive. Two million years ago proto­humans began carving out a 
new ecological niche as scavengers. Derek Bickerton argues that the 
selection pressure to solve the recruitment problem could have been 
strong enough to produce the first proto­words.14 Words as sym­
bolic signs exchange information displaced from what we can see 
before our very eyes. Conveying information about time (past, pres­
ent, or future) and place (here, there, or anywhere) is a considerable 
advantage for coordinating a group of scavengers, especially when 
competing in a carnivorous world dominated by fangs and claws. 
Besides humans only bees and ants have achieved such displace­
ment in communication. The difference with their recruitment 
is that waggle dances and pheromones are not symbolic. Our signs 
are.
The fundamental difference between indexical and symbolic com­
munication systems is that indices are only supported by the strength 
of what is the case, whereas symbols are supported by both what is 
and what is not the case. Consider first how an indexical sign works. 
When a smoke detector goes off, the beep indicates the presence of 
smoke. If the microwave made the same beep as the smoke detec­
tor, then the strength of the smoke detector’s beep as an indicator of 
12 See William O. Dingwall, The Evolution of Human Communication Systems, 
in Haiganoosh Whitaker and Harry A. Whitaker, eds, 4 Studies in Neurolinguistics 
(Academic 1979).
13 See Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney, and Peter Marler, eds, Monkey Responses 
to Three Different Alarm Calls: Evidence of Predator Classifications and Semantic 
Communication, 210 Sci 801 (1980).
14 Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue (cited in note 11).
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smoke is considerably weaker. An indexical sign is only as strong as 
the direct association that supports it. 
Consider how the words eat and drink work as symbols. Why 
don’t we drink M&Ms or eat milk? Because a rule of the word eat 
is that the object it takes must not be a liquid. As a symbol eat con­
veys the meaning of chewing and swallowing, and, simultaneously, 
it does not convey the meaning of simply swallowing once taken 
into the mouth. Eat is supported by all of the symbols for edibles 
that are solid, as well as all of the symbols for potables that cannot 
be chewed before swallowing. Notice the openness of a symbolic 
system to the unforeseeable. If you were to encounter a completely 
foreign digestible called a rath, without any teaching you would 
know in a conversation whether you would say you “drink it” or 
“eat it” based upon whether it is a liquid or a solid.
Words then are linked to each other in an interlocking set of rela­
tionships governed by rules. And with words come concepts. Words 
that are free of time and place are free for, as Bickerton calls it, 
offline thinking. He carefully explains:
I’m not saying that “concepts are words,” or “you have to have 
a word to have a concept.” Least of all am I saying, “You can’t 
think without words.” . . . The difference between online and 
offline thinking is . . . that in online thinking, what’s being 
thought about is right there in front of you, while in offline 
thinking it isn’t. . . . [O]ffline thinking . . . by definition [is] 
thinking about [what] can’t be there. Only the concepts can 
be there. . . . Words are simply permanent anchors that most 
concepts have—a means of pulling together all the sights and 
sounds and smells, all the varied kinds of knowledge we have 
about what the concept refers to. But once the brain found the 
trick of making concepts, it no longer needed a word as the base 
for a new concept. It just needed some place where all the knowl­
edge could come together and link with other concepts.15
Now imagine what a primate with a disposition toward play 
could do combinatorially with concepts not bound to the here and 
now. It could create things that do not exist, like devils or unicorns 
that poop rainbows. It could, as every human community does, pol­
ish language for poetic and artistic purposes, and it could, as every 
human community does, use language to construct a Weltanschau­
ung.16 Playing with concepts is also serious business when survival 
hinges on successfully adapting to facts. Disappointment and doubt 
15 Id at 207–08.
16 Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (McGraw­Hill 1991).
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42 Humankind in Civilization’s Extended Order
about the environment when combined with mammalian playful 
curiosity yield a desire to search for the truth of reality, that is, it 
yields science. In every language ever studied people can express the 
concept/value true.17
Once the pilot light of a symbolic mind was lit, categorical dif­
ferences in kind become possible in our patterns of doing and think­
ing. Birds may build nests and beavers dams and lodges, but nei­
ther’s construction projects require imagining what might be more 
useful or productive in the future. They simply do what is neces­
sary to construct the artifact: Move tree matter from there to here 
and adhere with mud. In addition to producing artifacts, animals 
also use primary tools. Chimpanzees prepare sticks for extracting a 
snack from a termite hill and crush leaves into sponges for drink­
ing water.18 But only humans make and use tools to make and use 
derivative tools, and all humans do this.19 When no longer confined 
to the here and now, a little creative tinkering can transform some­
thing currently not useful or possible into something that might be 
in the future. Integrate this tinkering disposition into a practice, and 
know­how isn’t simply passed on from generation to generation; it 
accumulates from generation to generation. And it accumulates in 
the dispersed minds of the community. With each successive gen­
eration human conspecifics become increasingly different, increas­
ingly unequal.
If the symbolic mind supports two large discontinuities, language 
and creativity, between humans and nonhumans,20 why stop with 
just these two differences? When Matt Ridley observes that no other 
species is as innovative as humans, he explains it as an extension of 
a third large discontinuity: humans are the only animal to routinely 
exchange one thing for another thing.21 For two people to exchange 
for mutual benefit it is necessary for their minds to escape the here 
and now. 
Suppose Adam has apples and Oz oranges. To voluntarily exchange 
their goods both must imagine a future state of the world in which 
Adam has oranges and Oz apples. That is, both must imagine that 
as Adam hands over the apples Oz hands over the oranges. Say that 
Adam chooses to move first, handing the apples over to Oz. Adam 
forgoes the apples in the here and now, holding in his mind several 
17  See Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar: 
Theory and Empirical Findings 2 (Benjamins 2002). The same is not true for false.
18 See Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
19 Brown, Human Universal (cited in note 16); see also Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: 
Primes and Universals (Oxford 1996).
20 Bickerton, Adam’s Tongue (cited in note 11).
21 See Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves (Harper 2010).
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symbols of the present: (1) a future Oz (2) who hands over in the 
future (3) some future oranges (4) to a future himself. A future Oz is 
symbolic because it does not directly refer to the Oz standing before 
Adam. Yes, a future Oz points to Oz, the person in the present. If it 
didn’t there could be no symbol of a future Oz. But a symbol, like 
a future Oz, conveys meaning m only in a context in which not(m) 
could also occur but didn’t.22 Every human community employs the 
logical notion of “not.”23
A future Oz conveys a meaning in the here and now because 
Adam could have chosen not to hand over the apples and instead, 
say, kill Oz and take his oranges. It is this tacit understanding of all 
the explicitly discarded information that is not the case that gives 
meaning to the symbol of a future Oz (and all the other symbols in 
the exchange). 
Killing Oz is not a far­fetched alternative, as evidenced by the 
Greek for “to exchange,” katallattein, which at one time also meant 
“to change from enemy into friend.”24 So when Adam has the oppor­
tunity to not hand over apples in the here and now and he shows 
that that is not true, his action of handing over the apples supports 
the interlocking symbolic relationships of exchange. Given that 
chimpanzees are firmly bound to the here and now,25 it’s no wonder 
that they do not barter:26 they cannot entertain the counterfactuals 
necessary to support giving up something of lesser value to attain 
something of greater value. All human communities trade things.27
A fourth large discontinuity from other animals is that humans 
are moral beings, and without symbolic thought we could not be 
moral. At the core of morality is the abstract evaluation of what 
is good. The concept good is atomic; that is, no other atomic con­
cepts (also called “semantic primes”) can define it and its indefin­
able except of itself.28 Some human communities contrast the term 
“good” with a term “not good” and others with a term for “bad.” 
But no human community expresses the contrasting terms as “bad” 
and “not bad” with no term for “good.”29 Only with “good” and 
“bad” can “not bad” express an intermediate case. A word for good 
22 Deacon, The Symbolic Species at 79–92 (cited in note 10).
23 Brown, Human Universal (cited in note 16).
24 See Friedrich A. Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation, and Liberty 108 (Chicago 1976).
25 Deacon, The Symbolic Species (cited in note 10).
26 See Sara F. Brosnan et al, Chimpanzee Autarky, 3 Plos One 1, (2008), online at 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0001518.
27 Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
28 Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19).
29 Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
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is universal and universally unmarked.30 Without any need for a def­
inition, good means good to every person in every language what­
ever the word for it is. 
Doing good consists not in the good things we get to satisfy our 
most basic animalistic impulses to ingest, excrete, and avoid pain, 
heat, and cold. Doing good consists in the good direction of our 
motives which good things satisfy.31 To ascribe a motive as good, 
someone else’s or one’s own, requires the abstract concepts you and I. 
Dolphins, elephants, and nonhuman apes can recognize themselves 
in mirrors,32 which is a necessary condition for an “I” to understand 
“your” motives, but none can evaluate motives of others with the 
abstract concept of good because good stands outside the here and 
now.33 All human languages contain pronouns,34 and more specifi­
cally, pronouns for the abstract concepts you and I.35 Both you and 
I stand outside the present, the pronouns for which are symbols 
of someone who both has acted in the past and will act in the 
future.
Unlike a chimpanzee that can identify a self, for us symbolic 
thinkers there is not simply a self in the mirror because there is no 
self without other selves. There is an “I” in the mirror that we get to 
know by experience of the “We.”36 “I” is not a trivial concept. It is 
the only concept which only I may use to refer to myself. No other 
30 Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and Universal Grammar (cited in note 17), 
argue that bad is also a universally distinct concept even though it is more readily 
expressed in some languages as not good: Goddard and Wierzbicka, Meaning and 
Universal Grammar at 496–97 (cited at 17). If the word for bad in another language, 
like Acehnese, connotes something stronger than bad does in English, then the 
contextual use of the word for bad in Acehnese may less readily call for not good 
as opposed to bad.
31 “ ‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that 
produc’d them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in 
the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within 
to find the moral quality.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 307 ([1740] 
Oxford 2000) (David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton, eds).
32 See Frans B.M. de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved 
(Princeton 2006).
33 See Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and 
Shame (Basics 2012).
34 Brown, Human Universals (cited in note 16).
35 Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19).
36 Compare with Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments 113 ([1759] Liberty 
Fund 1982): “Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in 
some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no 
more think of his own character. . . . Bring him into society, and he is immediately 
provided with the mirror which he wanted before.” Once there is a “We,” each “I” 
can imagine Adam Smith’s impartial spectator. 
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person uses the concept I to refer to me. The problem which moral­
ity solves is how all the individual I’s in a community of “We” can 
fittingly satisfy their basic impulses while maintaining the primate 
pleasure of being in each other’s company.37 We not only demand 
that others do good. We also care that we ourselves supply good con­
duct. Both the demand and supply of good conduct are a function of 
conceptualized motives. The outward action is the symbolic sign.
When this talking, trading, innovating, motive­ascribing little god 
of a hominid appears 150,000 to 50,000 years ago on the Pleistocene 
plain, it is living in bands with unique features. First, humans com­
pete in groups more “extensively, fluidly, and complexly” than any 
other sexual organism.38 Unlike the mainly inbreeding bands of non­
human primates, early human bands were exogamous.39 And with 
the exchange of women spread dispersed technical innovations in 
controlling fire and its applications to roasting and boiling food.40 
Now why would a symbolic species go about exchanging women? 
Because, secondly, Homo sapiens is the only species to compete on 
a large scale group against group.41 Unlike any other species, other 
humans were the primary reason why early humans did not survive 
or reproduce.42 Humans are one of three species that deliberately 
and frequently kill conspecifics over territory. 43 The other two are 
chimpanzees and wolves, which are also groupish and highly social. 
But only in humans did kinship ties from exogamy ever so slightly 
decrease the frequency of intergroup violence. Early Homo sapiens, 
though, was not done converting enemies into friends. Their enemies­ 
turned­friends were conspecifically, no, personally, known to each 
other, being just down the road. Modern Homo sapiens takes exchange 
much further, converting the personally unknown from enemies into 
honorary friends. But I divulge too soon.
To protect themselves against external threats other gregarious 
species flock, herd, or school to form large groups of anonymous 
masses. When the principal threat is within the same species, the 
37 Id at 116: “Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an 
original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught 
him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She 
rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own 
sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.”
38 See Richard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems 80 (Aldine 1987).
39 Hockett, Man’s Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
40 See Chester S. Chard, Man in Prehistory (McGraw­Hill 1969), in Hockett, Man’s 
Place in Nature (cited in note 5).
41 See Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (cited in note 38).
42 Id at 80.
43 See Richard Wrangham, Killer Species, 133 Daedalus 25 (2004).
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between-group aggression formatively begets the unlearnt feelings 
for living within the group. Larger groups create more potential con­
flicts of interest, that is, greater costs of living within the group. 
Thus, to minimize these costs the unlearnt feelings selected for liv­
ing within the group were constitutive of common purposes and 
common ends. If there was no between­group aggression, instincts 
of solidarity would not have been necessary. The unlearnt feelings 
that support between­group aggression can be glossed as enmity, ill 
will, and hate for those outside the “We” and amity, goodwill, and 
love for the members of the “We.”
Mutualism governs the relations of an “I” in the “We.”44 People 
participate in a war party with other people in the group because 
they think that people want to be successful in the raid, that each 
“I” wants the same thing. The people in the group also think that 
success in the raid will be good for everyone in the group, and each 
“I” thinks that it will be good for “me” too. The war party, however, 
will not be successful if some people don’t do their part. Because of 
this, each “I” wants to do his part in the war party. Each “I” does his 
part not because he is restrained by the “We” to do so, but because 
he socializes his own conduct to be able to live in the “We.”45 
The most distinctive feature of the “We” in early human groups 
is their egalitarianism.46 The social structures of our most closely 
related primates are hierarchical. Christopher Boehm hypoth­
esizes that the selection pressure from large­game hunting trans­
formed what must have been hierarchical groups of hominids in the 
Miocene into egalitarian groups in the Pleistocene. This evolution 
requires dispositions to control upstart dominants, incorrigible devi­
ants, and sneaky free­riders. As an example of the problems egalitar­
ian groups face, Boehm recounts Colin Turnbull’s story of Cephu, a 
Mbuti Pygmy from the Congo region of Africa. On the day of the 
recounted incident Cephu’s band went hunting for forest antelope. 
Unlike large­game hunting, which men carry out with projectile 
weapons, this hunting expedition was for small game and involved 
the entire group. The men would set up large nets in a semicircle 
44  See Anna Wierzbicka, Imprisoned in English: The Hazards of English as a Default 
Language 111 (Oxford 2014); see also Michael Tomasello, Why We Cooperate (MIT 
2009).
45 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments at 182 (cited in note 36): “When he views 
himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that 
to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If 
he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his 
conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon 
this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his self­love, and bring it 
down to something which other men can go along with.”
46 Boehm, Moral Origins (cited in note 33).
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and the women and children would noisily drive the prey toward 
the traps. Each man would spear the prey in his net and feed his 
family with it.
If every man set up his net in the large semicircle, no redistribu­
tion would be required. Every net would catch something. Cephu, 
however, decided that he would improve his chances by moving 
his net ahead of everyone else’s. He didn’t think anyone saw him 
in the dense forest. Cephu was wrong. Upon returning to the main 
camp, the other men relentlessly hurled insults at him. He was even 
denied a chair by a mere youth. Cephu tried to cover up his devi­
ousness with the lie that he had lost the group in the forest, but 
the band would hear nothing of it. They knew what had happened 
and he knew that they knew what had happened. Cephu eventually 
broke down with an apology and an offer to hand over the meat. The 
band seized it all, including a liver that his wife had hidden in antici­
pation of just such an eventuality. With that reparation, Cephu was 
again an accepted member of the band.
Apart from his close family, the band was united against Cephu. 
The group shared rules of conduct and had agreed on the facts, the 
significance of which Boehm explains: “[t]his singularity of pur­
pose is important because if a consensus is not built before action 
is taken, what might otherwise have been an instance of efficient 
group sanctioning can turn into sheer factional conflict, with both 
sides claiming moral rectitude,” and so on and so on as in the Hat­
fields and the McCoys.47 Like Boehm, Alexander emphasizes that 
groups maintain cohesion with rules that serve as “restraints on 
particular methods of seeking self­interests, specifically on activi­
ties that affect deleteriously the efforts of others to seek their own 
interests.”48 Such are the demands of morality upon our conduct. 
But why did everyone else in Cephu’s band not defect? Was it solely 
out of a fear for being treated like Cephu, or have humans, as Dennis 
Krebs posits, “acquired the disposition to obey rules when no one 
is watching”?49 The band apart from Cephu supplied good conduct 
because each “I” of the group thought it would be good for the group 
and good for each “me.” Each “I” in the group, as Lionel Tiger and 
Robin Fox explain, “is not so much closely connected with the prod­
uct of his own labor as he is with the product of the joint labors of 
his group, in a direct and satisfying way.”50
47 Id at 244.
48 Richard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems 80, 81 (Aldine 1987).
49 Krebs appears unaware that he is channeling Adam Smith via his Darwin­
inspired project. See Dennis L. Krebs, The Origins of Morality 84 (Oxford 2011).
50 See Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal 132 (Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston 1971).
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Cephu was not the first nor was he the last of his band to seek 
more and better. But no member of any other species could act as 
he did with the purpose of achieving more in the future. Along with 
good and bad, not and true, and you and I, want and more are also 
universal human concepts that stand outside the here and now.51 To 
want more and to want better is to be human. “A million years 
of natural selection,” says Ridley, “shaped human nature . . . not 
to settle for contentment: people are programmed to desire, not to 
appreciate.”52 That is not to say that after all that time we want 
more and better with clarity. We may, like Cephu, confusedly seek 
to satisfy the restlessness in our breast. Humankind errs as long we 
strive. Good people in their dark impulses, though, are well aware 
of the proper course.
We now turn to business.
I I I .  T H E  F I R S T  P A R T  O F  T H E  T R A G E D Y
On the eve of civilization human bands lived in egalitarian Gar­
dens of Eden. The boundaries between these Edens were, lest we 
with rose­tinted nostalgia forget, bloody and deadly.53 But inside 
each Eden what universal sentiment ennobled humankind with the 
ideal of equality? The usual story, as I have already stated, rests on 
the selection pressure to make group hunting of large game effica­
cious. The usual presentation of the story, as Boehm exemplifies, 
begins by contrasting actions that support and hinder the pursuit 
of large game. There are those actions that must be good, such as 
“sharing” the product of the hunt “equally,” and those that must 
be bad, such as “bullying,” “cheating,” and “thieving” others out 
of “their shares.”54 It is easy to read our own modern valuations 
into the problem, as I did above when I summarized the problem as 
“control[ling] upstart dominants, incorrigible deviants, and sneaky 
free­riders.” Attaching the value judgment of bad to actions that are 
“punished” for not supporting efficacious large game hunting, how­
ever, is insufficient to begin answering our question on the origins 
of our egalitarianism, for it fallaciously assumes as a conclusion that 
which we wish to explain. The problem is often posed as what are 
the evolutionary origins of the mental structure called a conscience, 
“a mechanism that induces people to pass judgment on themselves 
51 Wierzbicka, Semantics 76–78 (cited in note 19).
52 Ridley, The Rational Optimist at 27 (cited in note 21).
53 See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined 
(Penguin 2012).
54 Boehm, Moral Origins at 152 (cited in note 33).
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and their behaviors.”55 But as Adam Smith astutely recognized, 
“[t]he word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty 
by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the 
existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our conscious­
ness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions.”56 The 
question of how we think and feel about the equality and inequality 
of ends remains. We need an amoral sentiment to jumpstart a moral­
izing tradition.
Suppose Cephu finds success on a large game hunt but his fellow 
hunters are not so fortunate. To assume that Cephu has evolved 
a conscience that approves of sharing the hunt equally and disap­
proves of bullying others out of their shares raises the question why 
Cephu cares about a sharing norm and equality. It also begs the 
question of why the rest of the band cares about equality. So let’s 
first consider what the unsuccessful families think and feel.57 Upon 
Cephu’s return to camp, the other hunters and their families think 
to themselves that something good has happened to Cephu and that 
it didn’t happen to them. Moreover, it is bad for them that their 
hunter returned without anything, for they have no food. They want 
good things like a successful hunt to happen to them. When they 
think about Cephu’s success and their hunter’s lack thereof, they are 
reminded that they are without food and they feel bad. 
What will hungry people who feel bad do if they remain hungry? 
They will take the food from Cephu. If Cephu fears that his band 
will take food from him and potentially leave him and his family 
without any, what will Cephu do? He will give portions to the other 
families to make them feel better. A tiny, ε > 0 portion will not suf­
fice because the families will still feel bad. How far will Cephu go in 
doling out portions? From his prior experience Cephu knows that, 
despite his finely honed hunting skills, sometimes the prey won’t 
cross his path. Cephu knows that sometime in the future he will be 
in the same position as the other families, thinking and feeling like 
they think and feel now. Knowing how large game hunting works 
and empathizing with the other families, Cephu gives each family 
the same portion he gives his own.
If Cephu and his band pass this pattern of action down to their 
sons, and their sons to their sons, and so on and so on, then the band 
55 Krebs, The Origins of Morality at 207 (cited in note 49). See also Boehm, Moral 
Origins at 152 (cited in note 33).
56 Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments at 326 (cited in note 36).
57 In addition to want, Wierzbicka, Semantics (cited in note 19), identifies three 
other atomistic mental predicates that are universally found in human languages: 
think, feel, and know.
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follows the practice of sharing the hunt. Because this practice of 
sharing has survival value, the practice gradually gives rise to what 
we call memory and foresight, that is, a belief outside the here and 
now that pursuing the end of sharing is good.58 Integrate this belief 
into the verbal play of communicating this value to each other and 
we have more than the practice of a dolphin or a monkey; we have 
tradition.
Our question remains unanswered: What is the universal sen­
timent that ennobled humankind with the ideal of equality? It is 
the same sentiment that L.P. Hartley’s dystopia obsessively fears 
in Facial Justice and the same sentiment that depraves Melville’s 
Claggart, wracks Shelley’s monster, spurs Shakespeare’s Iago, and 
consumes Milton’s Satan. That sentiment is envy. 
Envy is a universal human sentiment, and every human commu­
nity symbolically copes with the fear of envy.59 But how can the 
principle of—in your most mellifluous French—égalité be founded 
upon so odious a sentiment as envie? Surely, we exclaim with a 
tinge of indignation, the Good “E” cannot be founded upon the 
Bad “E.” We are more willing, perhaps, to admit that our desire 
for equality is founded upon empathizing with the gratefulness of 
those who benefit from reducing inequality. Gratefulness and envy, 
however, are counterparts to one another: If our desire for equality 
arises from empathizing with the gratefulness of the less equal who 
would become more equal with sharing, our fear of and antipathy 
for inequality can hardly fail to proceed from empathizing with the 
envy of the less equal.
Envy is connatural. No one has to teach us how to envy another 
person. We simply think and feel the desire to acquire something 
possessed by another person. We do, however, have to be taught, via 
tradition, how to keep a check on our envy. 
Envy is ubiquitous. The anthropologist George Foster collects 
examples from around the globe and across history of three of the 
most common envy­causing items: food, children, and health.60 Not 
surprisingly, all three comprise the core of a family’s survival. Cus­
toms around each item have sprung up as controls on the fear of the 
envy. For example, to avoid piercing eyes of envy, the Spanish in 
the village of Yegen would sit in the corner and eat with their backs 
58 This is what Hayek means when he says that reason “logically, psychologically, 
and temporally” follows from tradition, that is, “[m]an is not born wise, rational, and 
good, but has to be taught to become so.” Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 21, 23 (cited 
in note 2).
59 See George F. Foster, The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior, 13 
Current Anthropology 165 (1972).
60 Foster, The Anatomy of Envy 13 Current Anthropology 165.
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to the room.61 From Egypt to India and Taiwan families would give 
children denigrating names, like Small Snake or Pot, so as to sym­
bolically deny there is a reason to envy them.62
The etymology of envy provides a clue that points to further evi­
dence of the pervasiveness of envy in human history. Envy comes 
from the Latin invidia, which itself is the nominalization of invi-
dere: to look askance or maliciously upon, or to cast an evil eye 
upon.63 The evil eye is the eye of the envious person. “From time 
immemorial,” expounds the sociologist Helmut Schoeck, “suspi­
cion of witchcraft or black magic has fallen upon those who have 
had cause to be envious—of someone less ugly than themselves, 
of lucky parents, or the peasant with a good harvest and healthy 
cattle, etc. . . . It is a constant aspect of primitive existence. Some 
tribes, such as the Navaho of North America, the African Azande 
and the West Pacific islanders, the Dobuans, seem to have a par­
ticularly strong belief in witchcraft, but basically the picture is the 
same wherever the investigation is made.”64 Envy is at the very 
heart of such charming children’s stories as Cinderella. Supernatu­
ral witches are always ugly in modern fairy tales so that they have 
a believable motivation to harm the innocent protagonist. Schoeck 
also provides example after example of the connection between 
black magic and those whose circumstances are envied: “A bright 
child who matures early is regarded by the Lovedu as a future witch. 
Life is spent in perpetual fear of envy.”65 It is perhaps more useful for 
understanding Pleistocene morality to describe early bands of Homo 
sapiens, not as noble sounding egalitarians, but rather as invidiosi, 
envious people.
Envy is taboo. Try attributing it to someone in everyday conversa­
tion and see how well that goes over. Or try finding envy as a human 
motive in social science research or literary criticism. It’s there, but 
not easily found. For decades worth of volumes in the mid­twentieth 
century Schoeck finds not one single instance of the word in the 
subject index of major anthropology and sociology journals. Not one. 
He also identifies a “blind spot” toward the envy­motive in sev­
eral scholarly discussions of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor,66 this 
despite chapter twelve’s title, “Pale ire, envy and despair” (Milton’s 
61 Id at 180.
62 Id at 176–77.
63 See the entry for invideo, online at http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/invideo#Latin 
(last visited Oct 15, 2015).
64 See Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour 40 (Liberty Fund repr 
1987).
65 Id at 50.
66 Id at 168–71.
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description of Satan sans the comma after “pale”).67 The unwilling­
ness to acknowledge envy at work in human intercourse continues 
to this day. The Wikipedia page for Melville’s novella is devoid of 
any words beginning with “env.”68 As Foster says, “[i]t is probably 
because of the enormous hold that envy has on us, and a measure of 
the inner depths to which it stirs us, that we are reluctant to admit 
to envy, and to discuss it openly . . . ”69
Envy is destructive. Left unchecked it can quickly lead to hate 
and hate to violence, tearing asunder the ties that bind a group. Any 
band that does not control envy will not remain a band for very long. 
Envy also feeds our tigerish thirst to exterminate our enemies. It is 
not accidental that Milton, after living through a decade of three 
English civil wars, endows evil incarnate with envy. 
Yet envy is a sentiment so unavoidable and so deeply implanted 
in the human condition that it would be unwise for any scientific 
inquiry into the sentiment to postulate that its ends are exclusively 
negative. Nor does it necessarily entail a moral judgment to call 
early Homo sapiens (and hence ourselves) invidiosi. As Nietzsche 
reads the Greeks of antiquity, envy also “spurs men to activity: not 
to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights 
which are contests.”70 Humankind’s activity can easily abate; we 
prefer unconditional rest. Envy roils us from inactivity and passive 
acceptance of our current lot to contest, to achieve, to be a better 
hunter, sewer, storyteller, toolmaker, healer, or cook. The activity 
of a contest frees the mind from the grasp of invidious compari­
sons. With an “I’ll­show­them” attitude, channeled toward positive 
achievement rather than destruction, the desire to overcome envy 
creates good.71 Envy, as Mephistopheles says of himself, is “Part 
of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the 
good.”72
The black mist has now crept low into the garden. Adams and 
Eves divide their labor as they have been doing for quite some time.73 
Allies through exogamy also engage in reciprocal gift giving trade. 
67  Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor (Simon & Schuster 2006). The novella was published 
posthumously based upon notes. Because later versions drop the title for chapter 12, 
see an early version of the book entitled, Billy Budd, Foretopman. 
68  Billy Budd, online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Budd (visited on Oct 15, 
2015).
69 Foster, The Anatomy of Envy 13 Current Anthropology 165.
70  See Friedrich Nietzsche, From Homer’s Contest, in The Portable Nietzsche 35 
([1872] Viking Penguin 1954) (Walter Kaufmann, ed, trans).
71 Schoeck, Envy at 415–17 (cited in note 64).
72 See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust 159 (Anchor Books 1963) (Walter 
Kaufmann, trans).
73 Ridley, The Rational Optimist (cited in note 21).
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Examples that have survived in present stateless societies include 
the ceremonial potlatch, kula, moka, and abutu.74 The symbols in 
gift exchange, such as the kula bracelets in the Trobriands, convey 
the meaning of goodwill and peace between groups, as well simul­
taneously not conveying the meaning of ill will and war. Indeed, 
failure to repay the gift exchange is “an act of hostility, a declaration 
that killing may now commence between the two groups.”75 The 
consequent peace between gardens supports exchange in ordinary 
goods and the use of natural resources, such a fishing in a host’s 
waters or quarrying for stone in the host’s territory.76 
All exchanges of ordinary goods are between personally known 
individuals, eyeball­to­eyeball. What everyone knows regarding the 
trade is what everyone sees, and what everyone sees is readily intelli­
gible. Adam knows that the fish he cannot obtain locally is found in 
Oz’s Eden. Oz also knows that the salt he wants is found in Adam’s 
Eden. More than that, each knows that they each mixed their own 
labor with the items to be exchanged. From beginning to end Adam 
and Oz easily comprehend the production and distribution process. 
It’s possible that Oz could personally secure salt for himself. It may 
be even closer than where Adam gets his, but certainly not closer 
than right here, right now. The exchange saves Oz precious time, 
and saved time in good times means marginal comfort and saved 
time in bad times means survival. When Adam and Oz exchange, 
each “I” thinks that it would be good for “me” and for the other “I,” 
and so, unlike with war parties and large game hunting, each “I” is 
becoming more closely connected with the product of his own labor 
than he is with the product of their joint labor, because there is no 
joint labor. There is interband trade in which all ends pursued are 
known to be good, in a direct and satisfying way. 
The serpent continues his temptation for a better life. By 12,000–
9600 BC people in the Levant are living in widespread permanent 
settlements exchanging for obsidian from central Turkey and black 
basalt and seashells from the Mediterranean.77 Moving rapidly toward 
a fully domesticated mode of subsistence, people by 9600–6900 BC 
are widely cultivating and harvesting cereals and raising goats, 
sheep, pigs, and cattle.78 The cauldron of civilization, the Mesopo­
tamian alluvium circa 6,500–3,800 BC, appears at first thought to 
74 See George Dalton, Aboriginal Economies in Stateless Societies, in Timothy K. 
Earle and Jonathon E. Ericson, eds, Exchange Systems in Prehistory 191 (Academic 
1977).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Barry Cunliffe, Europe between the Oceans: 9000 BC–AD 1000, 91 (Yale 
2008).
78 Id at 91.
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contain few resources and only one ingredient, grain. But a closer 
look in the pot reveals three other zones of specialized subsistence, 
all linked by exchange networks.79 Semiarid pasturelands support 
full­time herdsman. Orchards and gardens near permanent rivers 
and streams provide summer harvests. Swamps and watercourses 
supply fish, a major source of protein, and reeds, a local building 
material.
Suppose, for example, that a Cephu lives in protoliterate south­
ern Mesopotamia, sometime in the fourth millennium BC. His per­
sonal circumstances are particularly unfavorable, meaning he is an 
orphan, illegitimate son, halfbreed, or some other general outcast.80 
Part of the fit and proper background, Cephu lives on the far edge 
of the settlement, known locally as Daisy, for its rolling hills of 
flowers where the sheep graze. Compared to the rest of residents of 
Daisy, Cephu is destitute, owning virtually nothing.81 Compared to 
78 percent of us moderns, the residents of Daisy are destitute, liv­
ing on the modern equivalent of $1.25 a day, on a very good day. In 
Daisy there are the “have­nots” and the “care­nots.”82 
Most of the residents of Daisy think, feel, and act, in harmony 
with the age old customs attached to the different subcommunities 
of herders, cereal cultivators, fishermen, and textile makers. Special­
ized know­how is passed down from parents to children, generation 
after generation. Insights from a little tinkering here and there accu­
mulate in the dispersed minds of Daisy. Herders teach their children 
how to care for ewes having a difficult birth. Cultivators teach their 
children how to identify nonshattering spikes, an indicator of an 
easier harvest, in barley grasses. Eventually the wild barley is geneti­
cally modified, domesticated barley and only the recessive condi­
tion of nonshattering spikes is expressed. Children learn from their 
parents the customary rates for exchanging wool for reeds, dates for 
grain, fish for stone, and so forth. When under attack from roving 
bandits, the residents of Daisy defend each other against aggressors. 
The care­nots do not question the good and true values represented 
by the community. It is their simple acceptance of them which 
give Daisy’s existence its uncomplicated naturalness. This is what 
79 See Robert McC Adams, The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia 
and Prehistoric Mexico 48 (Aldine 1966).
80 Schoeck, Envy at 402 (cited in note 64).
81 Cephu may own nothing, but all human groups have property in “tools, uten­
sils, ornaments, and so forth.” Ralph Linton, Universal Ethical Principles: An Anthro-
pological View, in Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed, Moral Principles of Action: Man’s Ethical 
Imperative 655 (Harper 1952).
82 See Homer G. Barnett, Innovations: The Basis of Cultural Change 400 (McGraw­
Hill 1953).
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“We” do and how “We” do it. Experience supplies what understand­
ing cannot.
Cephu is a have­not invidioso. Every custom in Daisy chafes 
him. Not resigned to his fate, he seeks more and better than the 
grim existence of sub­subsistence. With nothing but a willingness to 
work long hours and a propensity to save, generic attributes of mid­
dleman minorities,83 Cephu peddles together some woolen textiles, 
dates, and dried fish and sets out for the far great North—Anatolia, 
Iran, or Syria—which he and everyone else in Daisy has only heard 
about in stories. In doing so, a have­not invidioso, thinking outside 
the here and now, breaks free from the Miocenian­old fear of aliens. 
With less to lose than a care­not, Cephu can attempt a risky change. 
Against the odds of being killed on the way, and not being killed 
upon arrival, he offers an Anatolian named Yahya (similarly on the 
fringe of his community) what little he has left in his cheap pack. 
In exchange Cephu receives tiny samples of dear things heard of 
but never before seen in Daisy: cedar and cypress oils (a bactericide, 
pesticide, and base for paints), common metals like bitumen and 
copper, and exotic metals like gold, silver, and lead.84 
And so a southern Mesopotamian and an Anatolian initiate a very 
slow and gradual process of connecting two very different communi­
ties through trade, very slow and gradual because the mutual aliens 
must find novel ground rules for forming their new linking cluster. 
The novelty lies not in the manifest fact that human conspecifics 
have never shared common rules of conduct with regard to each 
other. Every human cluster maintains cohesion in the face of group­
against­group competition with traditions that prescribe good ends 
and proscribe bad ends. The key proviso is that the “ethical systems 
function only in terms of in­groups,” that is, they only apply to each 
“I” in the personally known “We.”85 Aliens outside the “We” are not 
treated like the “We” are treated; they are simply another element 
of the natural world, like in this anecdote recounted by anthropolo­
gist Ralph Linton:
[T]he Maori of New Zealand, one of the most ingenious and 
philosophical of Stone Age peoples, showed all the virtues ad­
mired by Europeans in dealings with fellow tribesmen. Their 
attitude toward outsiders can be judged by the following: “A 
Maori relating an account of an expedition said incidentally, 
‘On the way I was speaking to a red­haired girl who had just 
83 See Thomas Sowell, Black Rednecks and White Liberals 65–110 (Encounter 
Books 2005).
84 See Guillermo Algaze, The Uruk World System: The Dynamics of Expansion of 
Early Mesopotamian Civilization (Chicago 2005).
85 Linton, Universal Ethical Principles at 649 (cited in note 81).
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been caught out in the open. . . . My companions remained 
with the girl while I went on . . . . As we came back, I saw the 
head of the red­haired girl lying in the fern by the side of the 
track, and further on, we overtook one of the Waihou carrying 
a back load of flesh, which he was taking to our camp to be 
cooked for food; the arms of the girl were round his neck whilst 
the body was on his back.’ ”86
In contrast, the novelty is that through trade each alien conspe­
cific becomes an honorary member of each other’s “We,” an entirely 
new category in the history of primate sociality—an enemy­alien 
becomes a friend. The category is new because honorary members 
are not full­fledged members of the original cluster; they remain 
aliens from another cluster, not personally known, not personally 
loved or cherished. In the museum of our mind there are no exhibits 
on the concrete ends of people we do not personally know. Mutually 
unknown circumstances and histories make it difficult to pursue 
good common ends.87 What is much less difficult and what honor­
ary members are afforded is that “I” do not do bad things to (an 
honorary) “you.” Each “I” evaluates “my” and “your” conduct in a 
common framework of general abstract rules that “largely consist 
of prohibitions (“shalt not’s”) that designate adjustable domains for 
individual decisions.”88
Notice the subtle shift. With members of the full­fledged “We,” 
I refrain from doing things that will end up bad for you and you 
and you because I know what is individually bad for each differ­
ent you. I personally know you and treat you as an individual. Each 
person can be treated differently because I know each one of you as 
an individual. Making a joke about someone’s appearance works for 
some but not others because I know who can take it and who can’t. 
Hence, “Do not joke about someone’s appearance” is not a general, 
nor abstract rule. It is a person­by­person rule for people that I know. 
In contrast, because I do not personally know an honorary “you” as 
an individual, the proscriptions are more abstract: for example, do 
not steal, do not deceive, and do not breach a promise.89 The rules 
are abstract in that any honorary member X can be inserted in the 
rule “Do not steal from X.”90 Every honorary member of the “We” 
is treated the same.
86 Id at 649–50.
87 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (cited in note 2).
88 Id at 12.
89 Id.
90 Of course, all general abstract rules also apply to full­fledged members of the 
“We,” but they apply personally by virtue of the membership in the “We.”
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The story now must change to tragedy and alienation, distance 
and distaste, anger and rebuke, foul distrust and disloyal breach. Sup­
pose Cephu finds success on subsequent trips to and from Anatolia. 
He serves as the middleman exchanging Daisy’s grain and woolen 
textiles with Yahya for cedar oil, bitumen, copper, and lead. What do 
Daisians think and feel about this business? Upon Cephu’s return, 
the residents of Daisy think to themselves that something good has 
happened to Cephu and that it didn’t happen to them. Moreover, it 
is bad for some of them; Anatolian metals are high quality substi­
tutes for local building materials. The customary rates of exchange 
for stones are no longer customary; they are becoming more and 
more unfavorable each day. The stone quarriers are working the 
same or even more hours and receiving less grain, dates, and fish for 
each finished tool.91 For many things, stones are becoming obsolete. 
The quarriers want good things like Cephu’s prosperity to happen to 
them.92 When they think about Cephu’s success and their deteriorat­
ing standard of living, they feel bad.
Unlike with interband trade, this process is unintelligible to Dai­
sians. When a Daisian exchanges with Cephu, each “I” is becoming 
even more closely connected with the product of his own labor. But, 
more important, each “I” is now disconnected from both the Anato­
lian labor that created the new product and the middleman’s service 
that brought the product to their settlement. The production and 
distribution process transcends individual perception. Daisians can­
not see and therefore do not know that their exchanges with Cephu 
are good for Anatolians. They cannot see the new rules of conduct 
that have changed enemy aliens into honorary friends. The ends 
pursued are unknown, in an indirect and rather unsatisfying way.
Some Daisians go further. They hurl insults at Cephu. They liken 
him in stories to a monster. They claim evil became his good. They 
say his success “stinks of sorcery.”93 He made nothing. He built 
nothing. He grew nothing. He herded nothing. And yet he created 
consumable riches out of woolen rags by buying cheap and selling 
dear. Cephu’s success, indeed, doubly stinks of sorcery.
Pishery­pashery, maybe. Surely mistaken on all sorts of facts. But 
my point is how easy it is to envisage a role for envy at the birth 
of civilization that is both positive and negative, productive and 
destructive, value­affirming and value­denying, value­appreciating 
91 Hence, as Hayek says, “[c]onstraints on the practices of the small group, it 
must be emphasized and repeated, are hated.” Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 13 (cited in 
note 2).
92 The rates of return from long­distance trade would be unfathomable, multiple 
hundreds of percent, or it might all be lost to roving bandits.
93 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 91 (cited in note 2).
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and value­depreciating. The paragraph above on Cephu’s success, 
like the corresponding one on Cephu’s successful large game hunt, 
is built from Wierzbicka’s definitional decomposition of envy. 94 
Envy itself is an amoral sentiment. How we act on envy and the fear 
of envy is a matter of morality.
As a precursor of the modern firm, Daisy, like all communities, 
was “a temporary aggregation of people to help them do their pro­
ducing in such a way to help others do their consuming.”95 The 
trade links, made possible by new rules of conduct between honor­
ary friends, combined with the zones of specialization to set off a 
chain reaction in the crucible of southern Mesopotamia. Seeking 
more and better people begin emptying the hillsides to form the first 
urban areas of Uruk.96 The stage is now set for the first extended 
order of civilization: “[T]he greater density of population, leading 
to the discovery of opportunities for specialization . . . led to yet 
further increases of population and per capita income that made pos­
sible another increase in the population. And so on.”97 The amity, 
goodwill, and love of the residents of Daisy for each other could not 
rescue the settlement from the winds of accumulated change. Daisy 
died, but the residents were saved. 
So begin the marvels of Homo sapiens. World GDP per capita, 
however, would remain stagnant for another few millennia.98 Very 
slow and gradual indeed, Adam Smith. What remains to be told is 
the tragedy of the second part, the wonder of the last 200 years.
94 See Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and 
Universals 98 (Cambridge 1999). 
Envy (X felt envy)
(a) X felt something because X thought something
(b) sometimes a person thinks about someone else:
(c) “something good happened to this other person
(d) it didn’t happen to me
(e) this is bad
(f) I want good things like this to happen to me”
(g) when this person thinks this, this person feels something bad
(h) X felt something like this
(i) because X thought something like this
Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Uni ver-
sals 98 (Cambridge 1999).
95 Ridley, The Rational Optimist at 115 (cited in note 21).
96 See Robert McC Adams and Hans J. Nissen, The Uruk Countryside: The Natural 
Setting of Urban Societies (Chicago 1972).
97 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit at 40 (cited in note 2).
98 See Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain 
the Modern World (Chicago 2011).
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